We examine the determinants of underwriter spreads in straight/fixed rate Eurobonds issued by US firms over the 1990-1998 period, and find no evidence of clustering around a single spread. We extend the existing domestic literature and find that currency risk clienteles, governing law, and distribution mechanism significantly influence Eurobond underwriter spreads. Consistent with the theoretical models of Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999), underwriter spreads are directly related to underwriter reputation. Proxies for agency costs including issuer/underwriter relationship strength and underwriter domicile also have a significant role. We also find significant differences in the determinants between non-financial and financial issuers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has witnessed enormous growth in both volume and sophistication of the international financial markets, and particularly the Eurobond market. 1 This growth has been facilitated by several factors including increasing globalisation, restrictive legal environments within domestic markets, illiquid domestic markets, and high barriers of entry into domestic markets (Giddy (1995, p. 129) ).
Despite the importance of the Eurobond markets as a source of international finance and the significant role played by underwriters in the market, there has been no prior study of the determinants of underwriter fees in that market. This is somewhat surprising as there is an extensive literature dealing with underwriter spreads in US domestic debt and equity markets. The focus of this literature has been on several issues including the effect on underwriter spreads of the certification and signaling of the quality of the issue by more reputable underwriters, of the benefits of an ongoing underwriter/issuer relationship, on the presence of maturity and risk based investor clienteles which may influence the marketing of the issue, on the possibility of scale economies in underwriter spreads, and on clustering in IPO underwriter spreads at the 7% level.
Our study of the determinants of underwriter spreads in Eurobond issues by US firms has several objectives. Firstly, it provides an opportunity to examine whether the key findings from the US domestic markets are robust within an international market context. In this respect our results highlight two areas where Eurobond underwriter spreads differ significantly from those in US domestic markets, specifically the absence 1 The IFR Database reports 1082 Eurobond deals with a value of USD$149,062m in 1990 increasing to 3535 deals with a value of USD$591,253m in 1998.
of clustering around a single value in Eurobond underwriter spreads and the role of underwriter reputation. Although models of the relationship between underwriter reputation and underwriter spreads as developed by Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999) suggest that more reputable underwriters charge higher spreads, empirical studies of US domestic markets have found that they charge lower spreads. In contrast we find that Eurobond underwriter spreads are directly related to underwriter reputation, consistent with the prediction from the theoretical literature.
A second objective of the study is to extend the domestic debt and equity market literature on underwriter spreads to incorporate two factors that are unique to the international debt markets, the presence of currency clienteles and the influence of governing law. The currency of denomination is an important element of the Eurobond contract which sets it apart from domestic bonds. While Eurobonds may be denominated in any currency of choice, issuers have access to cross-currency swaps to mitigate foreign exchange exposure. Investors of Eurobonds denominated in "exotic currencies", or currencies other than their home nation, will either incur the costs of cross-currency hedging or be exposed to foreign exchange risk. When investors face higher risks in investing in the issue, clientele effects may arise thereby generating additional distribution costs for the underwriter.
In order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the possibility of conflicting legal jurisdictions, Eurobonds carry a choice of law clause. This clause subjects the payment obligations of the borrower to one governing system of law, which provides a guide to the validity, enforceability, and interpretation of the contractual and other legal aspects of the Eurobond. In practice, the applicable legal systems most often used are the UK and New York laws. While the systems have many similarities, a difference arises in the requirements to renegotiate contract terms. Under English law at least two-thirds of bondholders at a special bondholders' meeting must agree to change contract terms, while three-quarters of the bond-holders must agree under New York law (Tennekoon (1990, p. 165) ). Moreover, in the early stages of development of the Eurobond market, New York was perceived as a heavily regulated securities market with a vast and complex legal framework. For these reasons, the choice of governing law may influence the risk and potential investor base for the issue, and thus the marketing effort required by the underwriter.
The study also differs from the US debt and equity market literature by examining the effect of the choice of distribution mechanism (i.e. a private placement or a public issue) on underwriter spreads. Equity market studies have focused on the determination of underwriter fees in IPOs (see Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Jain and Kini (1999) and
Hansen (2001)) or on seasoned public equity issues (see Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and Nanda and Warther (1998) ) and thus have been able to avoid the issue. On the other hand domestic debt market studies have generally failed to distinguish public and private issues (see Jewell and Livingston (1998) , Nanda and Warther (1998), and Livingston and Miller (2000) ). Thus the final objective of the paper is to examine the influence of the choice of placement mechanism on underwriter spreads.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II specifies a model of the determinants of underwriter fees that focuses on the role of certification and signaling by reputable underwriters, agency costs as reflected in the issuer/underwriter relationship, investor clienteles based on currency, investment horizon and credit risk, governing law, the distribution mechanism, and scale economies. The model is estimated on a sample of straight/fixed rate Eurobonds issued during the 1990-1998 period by US firms. 2 This data is described in Section III, regression results reported in Section IV, and conclusions summarized in Section V.
II. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The dependent variable in the model, denoted FEE and which we refer to as the underwriter spread, is the combined or gross fees charged by the underwriter for a Eurobond tranche, expressed as a percent of tranche proceeds. This gross spread includes management fees, sales commissions, and any other deal-specific fees charged by the underwriter 3 .
a. Certification and Signalling
Underwriters may provide certification and monitoring services for investors by generating an objective evaluation of the issue and communicating or signalling this evaluation to investors. Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) argue that high reputation underwriters provide superior certification and monitoring services and provide credible signals to the market concerning the quality of the issue, signals that low reputation underwriters are unable to replicate. Furthermore, Puri (1999) argues that high reputation underwriters incur greater costs in providing these services and therefore charge greater underwriter fees.
We follow Megginson and Weiss (1991) who suggest a market share approach to proxy underwriter reputation. The variable UW_MKT_SHARE, defined as the underwriter's market share of the entire Eurobond underwriting market (excluding equity linked issues) over the prior twelve month period 4 , is used to proxy underwriter reputation. A positive coefficient is expected on the underwriter reputation variable, reflecting higher charges for the greater level of certification services provided by more reputable underwriters. In contrast with this prediction, US empirical studies of underwriter spreads have generally found a significant negative relationship, with higher reputation underwriters charging lower fees (see Carter and Manaster (1987) , Roden and Bassler (1996) and Livingston and Miller (2000) ).
b. Agency Conflicts
Agency conflicts arise between the underwriter and issuer because of the contracting motivations of the two parties. The issuer is interested in acquiring the lowest cost of capital by paying a minimum amount of underwriter fees while receiving the maximum benefits from the underwriter. On the other hand, the underwriter seeks to maximize the fees received while minimizing the costs of distribution (Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) ). When designing the contract for the new issue, one of the determinants becomes the market demand for the security as observed by the underwriter. The issuer must rely on the underwriter to report this information truthfully when designing the underwriting contract (Baron (1982) ). Thus the level of information asymmetry between the underwriter and issuer is expected to determine the severity of the agency conflict.
James (1992) argues that where the issuer and underwriter have an existing business relationship, the agency conflict decreases. When an underwriter takes a new client to the market, it incurs a one-off cost in information production. However, if the issuer employs the services of the same underwriter in consecutive issues then these oneoff information costs are avoided. Thus, repeat business is expected to lower information production costs for the underwriter, decrease agency conflicts between the contracting parties, and lower underwriter fees. Although James (1992) finds that US equity issuers using the same underwriter between 1980 and 1983 pay lower underwriting spreads for consecutive issues than issuers that switch underwriters, subsequent empirical studies have found otherwise (see Nanda and Warther (1998) and Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) ). In support of their empirical findings, Nanda and Warther (1998) argue that repeat business efficiency gains are not shared by the underwriter. Rather, the issuer becomes more reliant on the investment bank to manage its financing activities and this allows the underwriter to charge higher fees on repeat business. 5 Alternatively, Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) argue that underwriters provide superior services for repeat clients and therefore charge higher fees. Also, underwriters may engage in "low-balling", a practice which DeAngelo (1981) describes as a situation where the supplier of services provides a discount in the initial fee with the expectation of earning quasi-rents in subsequent dealings with the customer.
To proxy these relationship/agency cost influences, we construct a proxy for the strength of the business relationship between the issuer and underwriter over the past three year period, REL_STRENGTH. Where the issuer has made one or more Eurobond issues in the previous three years, REL_STRENGTH is defined as the proportion of those issues (in value terms) that were underwritten by the underwriter of the current issue.
Where there were no issues in the previous three years, REL_STRENGTH takes the value of zero. 6 We also include an indicator variable, PRIOR_ISSUE, to control for firms that have not issued in the prior three-year period. The prior issue indicator variable takes 5 The argument is akin to the hold-up problem in banking (see Rajan (1992) the value of unity if the issuer has issued a non-equity linked Eurobond in the previous three years and zero otherwise.
As the level of information asymmetry is likely to be less for a recent issuer than non-issuers, and more information transparent issuers require less marketing and other underwriting services, we expect an inverse relationship between the prior issue indicator variable and the underwriter spread. However, with the conflicting predictions of the repeat business/switching literature, as developed by James (1992), Nanda and Warther (1998) and others, the expected sign of the coefficient of the relationship strength variable is uncertain.
Information barriers between national financial markets represent costs for both the issuer and underwriter when designing underwriting contracts (Giddy (1996, p. 415) ).
In the case of Eurobonds, it is hypothesized that there may be a greater probability of agency conflicts arising due to information asymmetries where the issuer and ultimate parent of the underwriter are domiciled in different countries. The information asymmetry between underwriter and issuer is proxied by an indicator variable, UW_US, that takes the value of unity if the home nation of the parent of the lead underwriter is domiciled in the US and zero otherwise. An inverse relationship is expected between UW_US and underwriter spreads.
c. Clientele Effects
Clientele effects have traditionally been defined as the set of preferences through which investors match cash flows to their preferred tax or income structure (Yong and Rene (1988) ). Thus, investors' preferences for varied cash flows are expected to affect their demand for financial instruments. Schnabel and Roumi (1994) argue that investors display a general level of risk-aversion and therefore the aggregate clientele effect is expected to create higher levels of demand for lower risk instruments. Extending the argument to the Eurobond markets, a greater demand for lower risk Eurobonds is expected to reduce distribution costs and lower underwriter spreads.
The primary sources of risk in the Eurobond markets are currency, investment horizon, and credit risk. Currency risk is proxied by indicator variables for six currencies;
the US dollar (USD), Japanese Yen ( Longer maturity fixed interest bonds carry higher levels of interest rate risk as their future cash flows extend over longer time horizons. A longer maturity instrument may also have a higher risk of default, as the issuer is obligated to maintain coupon payments for a longer period into the future (Merton (1974) ). The longer the maturity of a bond and the greater its investment horizon risk the greater are the distribution costs required to place the issue, leading to increased underwriter spreads (Livingston and
Miller (2000) and Roden and Bassler (1996) ). Investment horizon risk is proxied by the natural logarithm of the maturity of the Eurobond, LN_MATURITY, and is expected to be positively related to underwriter spreads 7 .
Eurobonds involve credit risk associated with future cash flows. However, Eurobond issuers generally need a high credit profile to overcome the information asymmetry barriers of issuing into foreign markets (Giddy (1996, page 316) ). Credit risk is proxied by the variable CREDIT_RISK that takes the value of 15 for 'Aaa' rated bonds, 14 for 'Aa1', 13 for 'Aa2' and so on. An indicator variable for 'Not Rated' issues that takes the value of unity for issues specified as 'Not Rated' and zero otherwise is also included in the model. The expected sign of CREDIT_RISK is negative, reflecting higher distribution costs incurred by underwriters when placing high-risk securities. However, the sign of the relationship between underwriter spreads and the 'Not Rated' variable is uncertain.
Financial instruments that include a direct claim on the residual assets of a company or trust are classified as asset backed, or guaranteed transactions. Asset backed bonds are represented by an indicator variable, ASSET_BACKED, which equals unity if the Eurobond is asset backed and zero otherwise. As, ceteris paribus, asset backed instruments have lower credit risk, a negative relationship is expected between ASSET_BACKED and the underwriter spread.
d. Governing Law
Eurobonds are unique vis-à-vis domestic bonds in that they carry an express choice of law embedded within the contract (Tennekoon (1990, p. 161) ). Generally the governing law chosen is either UK or New York law. As noted in the introduction, there are differences in creditor rights in the event of default between the regulatory 7 Using the natural log of maturity overcomes the skewness in the maturity variable.
jurisdictions, 8 together with a perception that the NY law is more cumbersome.
Moreover, with the Eurobond market's strong historical roots in Europe (Giddy (1996, p. 345)), specifically London, it is likely that the dominant pool of investors will favour contracts subject to UK law over those subject to New York law. Given investors' familiarity with local law, the information production costs for investors of Eurobonds with the UK choice of contract law are expected to be less, resulting in lower distribution costs and underwriter spreads.
To account for the effect of the choice of governing law, three indicator variables are defined. NY_LAW takes the value of unity for issues with 'New York' governing law and zero otherwise, UK_LAW takes the value of unity for issues with UK governing law and zero otherwise, and MISC_LAW takes the value of unity for issues with non-US and non-UK governing laws, and zero otherwise. The NY_LAW variable is omitted from the regression to avoid singularity. The UK law variable is expected to be negatively related to the underwriter spread, while the relationship between the other governing laws and the underwriter spread is uncertain.
e. Distribution Mechanism
The marketing costs of the underwriter depend on the distribution mechanism chosen to place the issue. Eurobonds are distributed either through a private placement or a public issue. Private placements are used on a reverse inquiry basis, where the underwriter caters for a private investor's needs. A reverse inquiry typically involves a show of interest by the private client of the investment bank for the given market security, which would then be supplied by the issuer through the underwriter. As disclosure requirements for private placements are limited and the underwriter places the issue directly with a pre-established target investor base, the distribution and marketing costs are limited (Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell (1993, p. 32) (2000)). These additional administrative and management costs are expected to add to the distribution costs of a public issue and therefore increase underwriter fees. Reflecting the higher costs involved in public issues, we incorporate an indicator variable, PUBLIC, which takes the value of unity for a public issue and zero otherwise. A positive relationship is expected between PUBLIC and FEE reflecting greater distribution costs for public issues.
f. Scale Economies
The transactions cost literature argues that there is a large fixed element in underwriting costs. 9 Consequently underwriting may exhibit economies of scale with average costs declining with increasing issue size. If these lower costs are passed onto the issuer, underwriter fees may decrease as issue size increases. We include the log of tranche size, LN_SIZE, to proxy scale related influences on underwriter fees. A negative relationship is expected between LN_SIZE and FEE reflecting economies of scale in underwriter fees for larger issues.
g. Control
The model also includes a control to capture any time trend in underwriter spreads. Thus TIME_TREND takes the value of 1 for issues launched in 1990, 2 for 9 Fixed costs include the administrative costs, legal costs, marketing costs, and necessary company specific research involved with any new issue.
issues in 1991, and so on. A summary of the model of the determinants of underwriter fees is provided in dollars with a median of US$143m. Public issues account for 82% of the tranches, the average maturity is 5.8 years, and 6% are asset backed. In 21% of the issues the governing law is that of New York State, while 76% are governed by UK law. The most common currency of issue is the US dollar with 39% of the issues denominated in USD, 13% in Yen, 9% in Deutschemark, 8% in Pound-Sterling, and 6% in Canadian Dollars.
The Eurobonds are of high quality with 96% of the tranches investment grade, 1%
below investment grade, and 3% 'Not-Rated'. In terms of Moody's ratings, 48.5% of the sample are rated 'Aaa', 20.8% rated 'Aa', 23.5% rated 'A', 3.6% rated 'Baa', 0.2% rated 'Ba', and 0.7% rated 'B'. In 86% of the issues the issuer had placed Eurobonds in the previous three-year period. There is also a high incidence of underwriter switching within the sample with 65% of issuers switching underwriters relative to their prior issue. In 48% of the issues the underwriter had a US based parent entity while the average market share for lead underwriters in the sample is 4.3%, with a range of 0 to 10%. 
c. Clustering in the Underwriter Spread
Recent studies by Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001) Saunders (1996) ). For the full Eurobond sample the Herfindahl Index value is 854 (1256 and 537 for the non-financial and financial sub-samples respectively).
Thus unlike US IPOs, there is little evidence of clustering around a single value in Eurobond underwriter spreads.
IV. RESULTS
The model as specified in Section II was estimated using OLS and White's (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator. Two forms of the dependent variable were modelled, FEES and LN_(FEES), but as the results were robust across both forms, to conserve space only the results from the linear form are reported in Table IV . Initially the regressions used the full sample of N=837 observations and a Chow F-test of parameter stability performed across the financial and non-financial sub-samples. As the test strongly rejected the null hypothesis of parameter stability, we report separate results for the non-financial and financial sub-samples in Tables IV and V The model fits the data reasonably well with an adjusted R 2 of 0.23 and 0.42 for the non-financial and financial firm regressions respectively. Moreover, the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients lend support to many of our a priori hypotheses relating to the determinants of the underwriter spread.
a. Certification and Signaling
The regression results for non-financial firms in Table IV are consistent with the theoretical analysis of Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999) who suggest that high reputation underwriters provide additional services in the form of certification, signaling, and monitoring for the new issue, and therefore charge higher fees. In REG 1 the proxy for underwriter reputation based on the underwriter's market share is positive and significant and suggests that underwriters, on average, will increase the underwriting spread by two basis points for every percent of market share they have in the Eurobond market. Noting that the maximum and minimum market shares in the sample are 10.5%
and 0% respectively, this suggests a difference of 21 basis points in the spreads charged by the most reputable and least reputable underwriters. Moreover, our result contrasts with the existing US debt/equity empirical literature in which an inverse relationship is found between underwriter reputation and fees (see Carter and Manaster (1987) , Roden and Bassler (1996) and Livingston and Miller (2000) ). In contrast with the results for non-financial firms, there is little evidence that underwriter reputation influences the underwriter spread on Eurobond issues of financial firms. 12 This is consistent with financial firms being better known to Eurobond investors than non-financial firm issuers and thus requiring less certification by the underwriter. Alternatively, financial firms may have the capacity to produce credible financial information that may substitute for the services normally provided by an underwriter.
In REG 2 of Tables IV and V we introduce an alternative proxy for underwriter reputation as proposed by Livingston and Miller (2000) and Johnson and Miller (1988) .
Thus underwriter reputation is proxied by the underwriter's top 20 league table ranking, UW_LEAGUE_RANK. Rankings are calculated for each year based on the dollar volume of all non-equity linked Eurobonds (for all nationalities of issuers) brought into the market. 13 The top ranked underwriter for the year is given a reputation value of 20, the second a value of 19, and so on. Underwriters outside the top twenty get a value of zero. Consistent with the market share proxy for underwriter reputation, the coefficient of UW_LEAGUE_RANK is positive and significant in the non-financial firm sub-sample, but not statistically significant for the financial firm sub-sample.
b. Agency Costs
In REG 1 of Tables IV and V the proxies for agency costs, reflecting asymmetric information and the effects of the issuer/underwriter relationship, provide mixed results and differ significantly across the sub-samples. The coefficient of the proxy for the relationship strength between issuer and underwriter is positive for both sub-samples but is only significant for financial issuers. The significant positive coefficient is inconsistent with the theoretical analysis in James (1992) that predicts that a strong investment 12 The coefficients of the proxy for underwriter reputation for non-financial and financial firms are significantly different at the 10% level. 13 Where issues have multiple book-runners, the nominal dollar amount of the issue is split evenly between all lead underwriters.
banking relationship reduces information asymmetry and hence underwriter spreads.
However the Eurobond results are consistent with the findings in Saunders and
Srinivasan (2001) and Nanda and Warther (1998) the James (1992) analysis predicts a positive coefficient. However, the coefficient of the switching variable is negative for both sub-samples but significant only in the nonfinancial sub-sample (at the 10% level).
The model includes two proxies for information asymmetry, the domicile of the underwriter and an indicator variable for having issued in the prior three year period in the non-equity linked Eurobond market. The coefficient of the underwriter domicile indicator variable is negative for both sub-samples but only significant for financial firms. Thus the underwriter spread is, on average, 37 basis points lower for financial firms where the issue is underwritten by US based underwriters than if the issue is underwritten by a non-US underwriter. This result is consistent with US underwriting firms having superior information, or perhaps having greater affinity with their US financial firm clients, than non-US underwriting firms. 14 On the other hand, the hypothesis that having issued previously into the non-equity linked Eurobond market 14 Another possibility is that underwriters may compete more vigorously for the business of domestic firms.
reduces information asymmetry and thereby lowers the underwriting spread receives little support in either of the non-financial or financial sub-sample results. The coefficient of the prior issue indicator variable is statistically insignificant for both sub-samples.
c. Clientele Effects
The REG 1 results in Tables IV and V Our results relating to the effect of investment horizon risk and credit risk on underwriter spreads mirror those found in studies of US domestic bond issues (see Livingston and Miller (2000) and Roden and Bassler (1996) ). The coefficient on the maturity variable, LN_MATURITY, is positive in both sub-samples consistent with underwriters charging higher spreads for longer maturity issues with greater investment horizon risk. However the coefficient is only statistically significant for non-financial firms, where an increase in maturity from five to ten years increases the underwriter spread, on average, by 14 basis points. With respect to credit risk, the coefficient on the CREDIT_RISK variable is significantly negative in both sub-samples consistent with underwriters charging lower spreads for higher quality firms. 16 On average, issues rated 'Baa3' carry underwriter spreads that are 43 basis points higher for financial issuers and 31 basis points higher for non-financial issuers compared with 'Aaa' rated issues. For those issues that are specified as 'Not Rated', the underwriter spread is negative and significantly smaller for non-financial issuers but is insignificant for financial issuers.
Also consistent with the risk clientele hypothesis is the coefficient of the asset-backed indicator variable which is significantly negative for the financial sub-sample and suggests that asset backing or protection reduces the underwriter spread by 43 basis points. However, in the non-financial sub-sample the asset backing variable has an incorrect though statistically insignificant positive coefficient. This may be attributable to asset-backed issues comprising only 1% of the non-financial sub-sample.
d. Governing Law
Another unique aspect of the study of underwriter spreads in Eurobonds is the ability to examine the influence of governing law. Issues by non-financial companies with UK governing law have significantly lower underwriter spreads (by 16 basis points on average) than those governed by New York law. This is consistent with Eurobond investors preferring the English law for familiarity reasons or alternatively because of a perceived advantage in renegotiating contract terms. However for issues by financial firms the spread is not significantly different across issues governed by UK and New
York laws respectively.
e. Distribution Mechanism
Prior studies of the underwriter spread in US domestic debt and equity markets have not considered the role of distribution method in influencing marketing costs and thus underwriter fees. REG 1 in both Tables IV and V provides strong support for the hypothesis that public Eurobond issues involve greater issue and marketing costs, and thus higher underwriting fees, than privately placed Eurobonds. The coefficient on the PUBLIC indicator variable is significant and positive, suggesting that ceteris paribus underwriter fees on public issues are 58 basis points greater than on private placements for non-financial issuers and 41 basis points greater for financial issuers.
f. Scale Economies
In REG 1 of both Tables IV and V the scale variable, the natural log of tranche size, has an insignificant coefficient. Thus, there is little evidence of scale economies in underwriter spreads of Eurobond issues by US non-financial and financial firms. This is consistent with recent studies of underwriter fees on US domestic debt issues (see Livingston and Miller (2000) and Jewell and Livingston (1998) ). To ensure that our finding is robust across functional forms, in REG 4 we introduce the scale variable in linear and quadratic form. If there are scale economies for small issues and diseconomies for large issues, the functional form will be 'U' shaped with the coefficient of the linear term negative and that of the quadratic term positive. However for both sub-samples the respective coefficients are incorrectly signed and statistically insignificant (suggesting an implausible inverted 'U' shaped function with weak diseconomies for small issues and economies for large issues).
g. Controls
The coefficient of the time trend variable is negative and significant at the 10% level in both sub-samples. The declining trend in the underwriter spread could reflect a range of influences including increasing competition in the market.
V. SUMMARY
This paper examines the determinants of underwriter spreads on relatively homogeneous sub-samples of straight/fixed rate Eurobond issues of US non-financial and financial firms over the 1990-1998 period. It makes several important contributions to the literature. Firstly it extends the existing empirical research on underwriter fees, which is largely focused on the US domestic debt and equity markets, to the Eurobond market by examining the possibility of clustering of underwriter spreads around a single value, and the effect of underwriter reputation, agency costs, investment horizon and credit risk clienteles, and economies of scale on Eurobond underwriter fees. Secondly, the data permits an analysis of the effects of the distribution mechanism and the domicile of the underwriter vis-a-vis that of the issuer on underwriter spreads, factors largely neglected in domestic market studies. Thirdly, it examines the influence of factors that are unique to the international bond markets on underwriter spreads, such as currency risk and the governing law. Fourthly, whereas prior studies have generally excluded financial firms from their sample of issuers, we estimate the model on sub-samples of non-financial firms and financial firms respectively.
Our principal findings are that: (i) There is little evidence of clustering in
Eurobond underwriter spreads around a single value as in the US IPO literature; (ii) The null hypothesis of a stable estimated relationship across non-financial and financial firms is strongly rejected. We find that non-financial firms pay significantly higher underwriter spreads than financial firms and that separate relationships for the determinants of underwriter spreads must be estimated for non-financial and financial firms; (iii) In contrast with prior US domestic market studies of underwriter spreads, our results for non-financial firms lend support to the theoretical analysis of Chemmanur and Pulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999) in which high reputation underwriters charge higher fees for the provision of superior services in the form of certification, signaling, and monitoring for the issue; (iv) Our findings in relation to the influence of asymmetric information and agency costs on underwriter spreads are somewhat mixed. Consistent with the US empirical literature, but inconsistent with the theoretical analysis of James (1992) There are several possible extensions of the research reported in this paper. For example, the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 raises an interesting question of its influence on the setting of underwriter spreads. The introduction of the Euro altered investor behaviour in the market, increased competition among underwriters, and thus is likely to have reduced underwriter spreads. Secondly, it would be interesting to extend the study beyond US issuing firms and particularly to Japanese, German and British firms who have traditionally been large Eurobond issuers. Thirdly, the study has been limited to straight/fixed rate Eurobonds and thus has excluded the rapidly growing Eurobond floating rate note market. As financial firms are predominant issuers in the floating rate market, a comparative study of the determinants of underwriter spreads on fixed rate
Eurobonds and floating rate notes of financial firms would be an interesting extension of the present study. Finally, there is considerable scope for a series of studies examining the determinants of the governing law, the choice of distribution mechanism (public issues vis-a-vis private placements), and the choice of underwriter in the Eurobond market. 
